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THE ISSUE OF "INSANITY" IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF MILITARY JUSTICE
Clarence E. Brand'
is insane or was insane at the time of
the offense charged. (See 35 c.)

Insanity of an accused soldier, either
at the time of the alleged offense or at
the time of trial, is a complete defense
and bar to his trial by court-martial.
By "sanity" is meant mental capacity
on the part of accused to commit the
crime charged, or mental capacity to
understand the nature of the proceedings of the trial and intelligently to
conduct or cooperate in his defense.
While an accused person, like any
other, is presumed to be sane, this presumption is displaced, for purposes of
the trial, by the slightest of evidence to
the contrary. The issue of insanity
must therefore be recognized and dealt
with as soon as it presents itself in the
course of court-martial proceedings,
and it may be raised at any time, even
after the sentence has been adjudged.
The following provisions of the Manual
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(When Charges Are Investigated)

35. COURTS-MARTIAL-PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL-Submission of and Action Upon Charges.-Investigation of charges; reference to staff
judge advocate; suspected insanity.
c. Suspected Insanity. An appointing
authority may, in his discretion, suspend
action on the charges pending the consideration of the report of one or more
medical officers, or the report of a
board convened under AR 600-5003 in a

case where that regulation applies and it
is practicable to convene such a board.
The medical officers or board will be
fully informed of the reasons for doubting the sanity of the accused and, in
addition to other requirements, should
ordinarily be required to include in the

report a statement, in as non-technical
language as practicable, of the mental
condition of the accused both at the time
of the offense and at the time of the examination. The appointing authority
may, in his discretion, attach the report
to the charges if referred for trial or
forwarded.

2
for Courts-Martial
indicate in outline

the continuous attention directed to
this issue throughout the consideration
and trial of court-martial charges:

(At the Trial)

63.

(Before Charges Are Preferred)

COURTS-MARTIAL-PRO-

Third: No charge will ordinarily be
referred for trial if he (commanding officer of accused) is satisfied that accused

CEDURE-Inquiry into Sanity of Accused.-The court will inquire into the
existing mental condition of the accused
whenever at any time while the case is
before the court it appears to the court
for any reason that such inquiry ought
to be made in the interest of justice.'
Reasons for such action may include

ILt. Colonel, Judge Advocate, V Army Corps,
Camp Beauregard, Louisiana.
2Manual for Courts-Martial, U. S. Army
(1928).

3 Army Regulation 600-500, providing for a
board of medical officers-to determine appropriate administrative dispositions of mental
cases.

30. COURTS-MARTIAL-PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL-Submission of and Action Upon ChargesGeneral. * * *

[ 331 ]

CLARENCE E. BRAND
anything that would cause a reasonable
man to question the accused's mental
capacity either to understand the nature of the proceedings or intelligently
to conduct or to cooperate in his defense. For instance, the actions and demeanor of the accused as observed by
the court or the bare assertion from a
reliable source that the accused is believed to be insane may be sufficient
reason. It should be remembered, however, that while a person who is insane
to the extent indicated above should not
be tried, nevertheless, until the contrary
is shown, a person is presumed to be
sane, and a mere assertion that a person
is insane is not necessarily and of itself
enough to impose any burden of inquiry
on the court.
The request, suggestion, or motion
that such an inquiry be had may be
made by any one of the personnel of the
court, prosecution, or defense. If such
an inquiry is determined upon, priority
will be given to the determination of the
matter, and the inquiry should exhaust
all reasonably available sources of information with respect to the mental
condition of the accused. If it appears
that such inquiry may be a long and expensive proceeding, or if the court desires to hear competent expert testimony, the court may adjourn and report
the matter to the appointing authority
with its recommendation in the premises. Such recommendation may include
in a proper case a recommendation that
the accused be examined as indicated in
35 c, and that the officer or officers, or
some of them, conducting the examination be made available as witnesses.
If the court finds that the accused is
insane, the proceedings so far as had
embodying the finding to that effect will
be forwarded to the reviewing authority; otherwise the trial proceeds.
(At Conclusion of Trial)
75. COURTS-MARTIAL-PROCEDURE-Introduction of Evidence.a. General Duties, etc., of court..* * *
If at any time before the court announces an acquittal or imposes a sentence it appears to the court for any

reason that additional evidence with
respect to the accused's mental responsibility for an offense charged should be
obtained in the interest of justice, the
court will call for such additional evidence. The court may adjourn pending
action on a request made by it to proper
authority that the accused be examined
by one or more medical officers and that
such officer or officers be made available
as witnesses. See 35 c (Suspected insanity) in this connection. A request,
suggestion, or motion that additional
evidence be called for by the court as
contemplated herein may be made by
any one of the personnel of the court,
prosecution, or defense. The court may,
in its discretion, give priority to evidence on such issue and may determine
as an interlocutory question whether or
not the accused was mentally responsible at the time of the commission of
the alleged offense. See 78 a (Reasonable -doubt). If the court determines
that the accused was not mentally responsible, it will forthwith enter a finding of not guilty as to the proper specification. Such priority should be given
where the evidence on the matters set
forth in the specification is voluminous
or expensive to obtain and has little or
no bearing on the issue of mental responsibility for such matters.
(By Reviewing Authority)
87. COURTS-MARTIAL-Reviewing
Authority.-* * * b. Powers and
duties. * * *
The reviewing authority will take appropriate action where it appears from
the record or otherwise that the accused
may have been insane at the time of the
commission of the offense, or insane at
the time of his trial, regardless of
whether any such question was raised at
the trial or of how it was determined if
raised.
Army Regulations provide, as an administrative procedure, that a soldier
suspected of insanity or mental incapacity will be placed before d board of
three medical officers, one of whom
must be a psychiatrist or a specialist
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in nervous and mental diseases, with a
view to the transfer of the soldier to a
hospital for the insane or his discharge
from the service, if his mental condition be found by the board to be such as
to incapacitate him for further service.
According to the usual procedure, if a
soldier under court-martial charges is
suspected of mental abnormality of any
character, the officer responsible for
the pre-trial investigation (normally
the regimental or post commander) orders the soldier to a hospital under this
Regulation for observation and for the
action of a board of medical officers
with regard to his sanity.
The period of observation in such
cases of suspected insanity normally
extends over several weeks, at the conclusion of which the board makes its
formal findings and recommends disposition of the case. If the board finds
the soldier to be insane, and therefore
incapacitated for further service, it recommends his discharge from the service, or his commitment to a hospital for
the insane, as the circumstances may
require. Action is taken, however,
only upon approval of the findings and
recommendation of the board by the
commanding general of the area in
which the hospital is located, based of
course upon the advice of medical and
legal staff officers who review the proceedings.4 Court-martial charges are
in this case automatically dropped. If
on the other hand the soldier is found
to be sane, the report of the medical
board is attached to the court-martial
charges, which are then (if otherwise
If commitment to a hospital for the insane is
indicated, a judicial hearing before an Army
Commitment Board is also required.
4

sufficient) ordered to trial. If the
charges are of such serious nature as to
warrant trial by general court-martial
they are, under requirement of. law,
examined by the staff judge advocate
(legal adviser) of the commanding
general before they may be ordered to
trial, and further observation or investigation into accused's sanity may
be ordered upon the advice of this ofcer if reasonable ground therefor appears.
When the case is brought to trial the
issue of accused's insanity, if raised,
comes squarely before the court for
determination ab initio, normally upon
motion by accused or his counsel, in
the manner indicated in paragraph 63
of the Manual quoted above. The defense has full liberty to raise the issue
at any time and present its evidence
thereon as it chooses. It may introduce
psychiatrists of its own choosing
(though it rarely does so) and such
other witnesses as it sees fit, subject
only to the usual rules of evidence.
These are in fact tempered by a broad
tolerance which gives an accused soldier unusually wide liberties in his defense before military courts. The defense may thus, and often does, inject
the insanity issue into the trial in the
midst of the prosecution's presentation
of its case, at a point designed to be of
most benefit to the accused, or the most
damaging and disconcerting to the case
of the prosecution; for this issue, once
raised, is given priority, and all other
matters are temporarily set aside.
If the question has been raised prior
to trial, the trial judge advocate (prosecutor) will now be prepared with the
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report of the board of medical officers,
and will call one of its members-normally its expert on mental disordersfor detailed examination and explanation of the board's report. If the issue
has not been raised before, and there is
substantial question with regard to accused's sanity, the court will normally
adjourn and recommend to the appointing authority that accused be
placed under observation in a suitable
hospital and that a board be appointed
for his examination. The hearing is
then resumed after sufficient time has
elapsed and the board has reached its
findings. The defense has of course full
right of cross-examination of the Army
psychiatrist, may call other members
of the Army board, or psychiatrists of
its own, and present other evidence as
it sees fit in rebuttal of the findings of
the Army medical board.
If the defense does not raise the issue
of insanity, or if it fails in any particular to develop its case fully after it
has been raised, the court will not hesitate to take the matter into its own
hands. Upon appearance of reasonable
cause, any member of the court may
take the initiative in this matter at any
stage of the proceedings, with practically the same liberties as are allowed
the defense. It is indeed the duty of
every member, and of the court as a
whole, to see that this important matter is not overlooked, and when once
raised that it is fully developed
through competent testimony based
upon adequate observation by qualified
witnesses.
The question of accused's insanity
thus expressly raised is determined by

the court as an interlocutory question.
That is to say, it is ruled upon in open
court by the law member, subject to
objection by any other member. Objection, if made, is decided in closed
session, by secret written ballot, by
majority vote of the court. In practice
the law member will usually ask to
have the court closed for deliberation
before making such ruling, especially
in close cases, in order to forestall objection by coming to agreement with
the majority of the court.
If accused is found insane on the interlocutory question, a finding of not
guilty is entered at once, and the trial
is ended. If accused is found to be
sane, the trial is continued. The issue
is again before the court inferentially,
however, when the final vote is taken
upon the general issue, since any member who believes accused to be insane,
or that he was insane at the time of the
alleged offense, should vote "not
guilty." Since at least two-thirds of
the members present at the time the
vote is taken must concur in a finding
of guilty, it is thus possible for a minority of the court to cause an acquittal
on the actual ground of insanity
through vote on the general issue.
When the case comes before the reviewing authority for approval or disapproval of the action of the court, and
in serious cases is referred for review
to the staff judge advocate before it
reaches the reviewing authority, the
issue of insanity is again considered, if
it has been raised; and it may be here
raised for the first time if circumstances exhibited in the record or
brought to official attention apart there-
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from indicate substantial question of
accused's sanity.
It is to be observed that the sentence
of a court-martial is not effective until
it has been approved by the reviewing
authority and has been ordered executed. Approval may not be given in
serious cases without the prior advice
of the staff judge advocate, and execution of the most severe sentences must
be withheld pending automatic appeal
to a board of review and the Judge
Advocate General, and in some cases
confirmation by the Secretary of War
or the President. Action of any one or
more of these reviewing and confirming
authorities may be delayed pending
any further investigation into accused's
sanity which any one of them may
deem appropriate (subject to legal limitations upon unnecessary delays); and
in case of determination at this time
that accused was insane at the time of
commission of the offense or at the
time of trial, the sentence will be disapproved and accused placed before a
medical board for disposition as an insane soldier, through commitment to a
hospital for the insane, discharge, or
otherwise.
All records of trial by court-martial
are again critically examined after
they have been finally acted upon by
the reviewing authority-in the case of
inferior court records by the staff
judge advocate of the officer exercising
general court-martial jurisdiction, in
the case of general court records by the
Judge Advocate General of the Army.
The issue of insanity again receives full
consideration upon this post-examination if it has been previously raised,

and may be here raised for cause
shown in the record or otherwise. If
the convicted soldier is found to be insane, based upoft past examination or
upon examination now ordered, his
sentence will be forthwith remitted as
having been adjudged through error,
and the case disposed of through administrative proceedings prescribed in
the case of an insane soldier.
It must not be presumed from what
has been said that the sanity of the
accused is always a major issue for the
determination of the various agencies
of military justice which have been
discussed. On the other hand it is in
its nature simply one of the issues
which may or may not arise. In the
large majority of cases it of course
does not arise at all. Its existence as
a potential issue, however, and its high
importance and relevancy as such to
the trial and determination of the
criminal offense charged is always a
matter for express consideration. Notwithstanding the presumption of sanity, it is therefore customary for the
pre-trial investigating officer to include
in his formal report of investigation
in all cases in which the issue of
insanity does not receive more specific
consideration a statement to the effect:
"I have no reasonable ground for belief that the accused is, or was at the
time of any offense here charged, mentally defective, deranged, or abnormal."
From the above outline of procedures followed in the case of an accused
soldier suspected of insanity it must
be clear that every reasonable effort
is made to determine in an impartial
and objective manner whether such
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suspicion is well founded, and if so to
substitute for the criminal proceedings
appropriate hospitalization or other
non-punitive humanitarian disposition.
At only one stage of these proceedings,
however, has the accused, or counsel
in his behalf, the right to contest the
proposed disposition of his case, although his assistance and cooperation
are at all times encouraged. At all
other stages of the proceedings, however, the soldier is a "patient," and
decisions concerning him are made by
medical and administrative officers in
very much the same manner as his
tactical commander would decide on
his appropriate employment in battle.
His own individual good is by no
means lost sight of in either case; but
the paramount consideration in both
instances is his conservation, disposition and employment as a component
of the Army of which he forms a part.
The one stage of the proceedings
where the accused soldier becomes
primarily an individual, with individual rights such as a citizen has, is
before the court-martial, in case he is
brought to trial.' Here he has benefit
of counsel of his own choosing and
may introduce in evidence in his own
behalf for the impartial consideration
of the court any competent evidence
he may choose. Notwithstanding the
report of the Army medical board and
testimony of its psychiatrist and other
witnesses called by the prosecution,
the accused may here introduce
psychiatrists of his own choosing and
•sBefore commitment to a hospital for the insane he is likewise entitled to a judicial hearing
before an Army Commitment Board.

may, through his counsel, subject the
Army medical officers to the most
searching cross-examination.
Why, then, we may well ask, does
not the battle-royal of psychiatrists
and counter-psychiatrists occur before
courts-martial as it not infrequently
does before the ordinary criminal
courts? Or does it? The answer is that
it does not; but the explanation is not
to be found in the difference in procedure before the courts themselves.
The difference begins long before the
trial. It appears most significantly in
the coldly purposive detachment and
objective impartiality of the entire
chain of medico-judicial proceedings,
of which the trial may or may not form
a part. This chain of proceedings has
as its essential motivation not simply
"justice to the accused," but primarily
"the good of the service," through necessary adjustment of relations between
the individual soldier and his military
environment. It must not be inferred
that the court-martial or other proceedings are devoid of human sympathies; but such sympathies for the
individual are distinctly and definitely
subordinated to the controlling consideration of reasoned justice in the
best interests of the service.
In the first place the court-martial
recognizes the board of medical officers
which has examined the accused as an
impartial, competent and well-informed
agency of the service, like itself. Its
interests and motives are identical
with the court's own. Its individual
members are unprejudiced (except in
the interests of the service), utterly
honorable and fair. Like the members
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of the court, they know the soldier
intimately and understand him thoroughly. The medical officer can honorably and reasonably have no interest
in the case as a criminal trial other
than to convey to the court what he
has learned of accused's mental capacity and responsibility. This is the
obligation of honor which he owes to
the service as well as to his own
conscience. He can in the nature of
things owe the accused nothing but
justice. His opinion given on the witness stand is essentially a professional
diagnosis upon which vital operative
procedure must be based. Since the
court must of necessity perform the
operation, the importance of utter
frankness between the witness and the
court is obvious to both. Not only
frankness, but indeed a high order of
proficiency in the fine art of the precise communication of ideas in ordinary language is essential; for it is
here necessary to make and convey to
the court a diagnosis of most difficult
and elusive subject-matter without the
aid of the diagnostician's technical
vocabulary.
The Army psychiatrist therefore proceeds with great caution on the witness
stand, avoids positive or categorical
statements from which erroneous inferences might be drawn in borderline
cases, and keeps constantly in mind
the importance of creating no more
assurance of accused's sanity in the
minds of the court than he himself
feels. He explains in a proper case
that there are degrees of mental unbalance or disturbance, and undertakes to picture to the court his

estimate of accused's mental state or
capacity by reference to a graduated
scale and with r-gard to norms which
the court understands, so that it may
feel the degree of doubt or assurance
which he himself feels-not more, nor
less. While the court must answer
"yes" or "no" with regard to accused's
sanity, and his guilt, it is not uncommon for the Army psychiatrist to
decline to be so pinned down to a
categorical answer. In a close case he
may take the position, in effect: "I
describe, as accurately as I can,
accused's mentality. You, the court,
must determine his legal responsibility."
After painstaking examination of
such a witness, in such an atmosphere
-and the court will rarely content
itself with the questions of the opposing counsel-it is easy to understand
that conclusions tentatively reached
thereby are not easily disturbed by the
testimony of a doctor or psychiatrist
of unknown prejudices and background, of whatever reputation for
competence and expert knowledge,
who may be introduced by the defense.
While to be sure the ears of the court
are formally open to receive any and
all such evidence, their minds are only
partially so; for the court must weigh
evidence as well as hear it, and the
partisan viewpoint of a "defense witness" to such a matter as this would
necessarily discount his credibility.
The most effective defense that can be
made on this issue is therefore, in the
usual case, to supplement the observations of the Army medical board by
testimony with regard to accused's
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conduct prior to its period of observation and otherwise unknown to it.
The wise defense counsel will then
recall the Army psychiatrist, bring out
through proper questions that the
newly discovered evidence was unknown to him at the time of his
observations of accused, and then put
the question, in effect: "If you had
known these facts, what then would
have been your estimate of accused's
mental responsibility?"
It must be observed that the prosecution would never consider the introduction of evidence of accused's sanity
other than the proceedings of the
Army medical board and the testimony
of its psychiatrist. The position of the
prosecution in this matter is in itself
of high significance, for it colors the
entire court-martial proceeding. The
prosecutor, or trial judge advocate as
he is known in military terminology,
has no duty to convict the accused in
any event, but merely to present to
the court all the evidence, fairly, and
with scrupulous honesty. An attitude
of hostility toward the accused or his
witnesses, other than that necessarily
involved in the impeachment of a
witness in a proper case, would be
instantly resented by the court, to the
prosecutor's own discredit. Extended
argument to the court, about matters
which it understands quite as well as
he, would be virtually an impertinence,
and such arguments are therefore not
made. Certainly the court would not
be favorably impressed by any attempt
of the trial judge advocate to explain
and interpret the testimony of the
psychiatrist which the court had itself

elicited in detail from the psychiatrist
himself.
It must be observed further that
while the prosecution normally presents the proceedings of the Army
medical board in evidence, and calls
its psychiatrist as a witness, this is
simply because of the fact that the case
is not brought to trial if the findings
of the board are in favor of the defense.
The board is always appointed to
determine whether accused is or was
insane, and in the usual case before a
prosecutor was appointed to try him.
In no sense can it be considered the
"prosecution's board," nor can it properly be considered prejudiced except
in the sense that its wholly impartial
examination and deliberations have led
it to more or less definite conclusions.
In every meaningful and significant
sense the Army medical board and its
psychiatrist are witnesses of the court.
In substantial effect they are more
than mere witnesses. The medical
board is virtually the official factfinding agency with regard to this
particular matter within the scope of
its especial competency, subject only
to the adoption by the court of its
conclusions.
Whether the above outlined system
of dealing with mental cases in their
relation to criminal administration
could be adopted more generally in
the ordinary criminal courts is to be
doubted. This specialized procedure
was expressly devised for and is
peculiarly applicable to our military
service. That such an improved procedure was compatible with the requirements of military justice-and the
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need therefor as a measure of military
efficiency as well as of individual
justice-appears to have been first
effectively recognized during World
War I, when no less a legal scholar
than Colonel John H. Wigmore, then
associated with the Judge Advocate
General's Department of the Army,
actually surveyed the situation and
drew the specifications for the required
procedure. When the Manual for
Courts-Martial was next revised, in
1921, it was upon the background of
this work that the present system was
elaborated. When the Manual was
again revised, in 1928, the wording of
these provisions was condensed, but
their substance was not changed, and
they remain the same today.
Experience has amply justified this
method of dealing with mental cases
in the Army. As has been at least
broadly suggested, the issue of insanity
is in fact effectively determined by the
medical board, either directly through
administrative action instituted by it,
or indirectly through its expert testimony before the court-martial if the
case is brought to trial. With the good
of the service and justice to the individual soldier as its guiding lights, the
Army medical board approaches its
determination of each case with a high
sense of responsibility and professional
detachment which immunizes it from
any extraneous influence that might

otherwise distort or confuse its views.
Criminal respcnsibility of the soldier
for the specific oflense charged is but
one aspect of the case. The mental
capacity of the soldier for further
military service, and his conservation
for such service or his elimination
therefrom if unfit, is the larger aspect
of the case. If his separation from the
service is necessary there arise further
questions whether he should be committed to a hospital for the insane
(after judicial hearing provided, and
within limitations imposed by law),
discharged in the custody of relatives
or friends, or otherwise disposed of.
Focused upon these larger aspects
of the case, both the medical board
and the court-martial retain a perspective which embraces both the
individual soldier and his military
environment and effectively exclude
from their consideration irrelevant
emotions of which juries sometimes
make bad law. Through twenty years
of experience with this system the
Army has virtually removed the
insanity issue from the courts to the
hospitals-without, however, depriving
the courts of their jurisdiction or the
accused of his individual rights. It
ippears fair to conclude that this procedure must have fulfilled the expectations of its distinguished progenitor,
and that it has justified his estimate
of the judicial capacity of officers of
the Army to administer it.

